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Abstract 
This study employed the delayed judgment-of-learning (JOL) paradigm to investigate 
the content of metacognitive judgments; after studying cue-target word-pairs, 
participants predicted their ability to remember targets on a future memory test (cued 
recognition in Experiments 1 and 2 and cued recall in Experiment 3). In Experiment 1 
and the confidence JOL group of Experiment 3, participants used a commonly employed 
6-point numeric confidence JOL scale (0-20-40-60-80-100%). In Experiment 2 and the 
binary JOL group of Experiment 3 participants first made a binary yes/no JOL prediction 
followed by a 3-point verbal confidence judgment (sure-maybe-guess). In all 
experiments, on a subset of trials, participants gave a written justification of why they 
gave that specific JOL response. We used natural language processing techniques (latent 
semantic analysis and word frequency [n-gram] analysis) to characterize the content of 
the written justifications and to capture what types of evidence evaluation uniquely 
separate one JOL response type from others. We also used a machine learning 
classification algorithm (support vector machine [SVM]) to quantify the extent to which 
any two JOL responses differed from each other. We found that: (i) participants can 
justify and explain their JOLs; (ii) these justifications reference cue familiarity and 
target accessibility and so are particularly consistent with the two-stage metacognitive 
model; and (iii) JOL confidence judgements do not correspond to yes/no responses in 
the manner typically assumed within the literature (i.e. 0-40% interpreted as no 
predictions).  
Keywords: metacognition, judgments-of-learning, episodic memory, confidence, 
linguistics
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Understanding Metacognitive Confidence: Insights from Judgment-of-Learning 1 
Justifications 2 
 3 
Cognitive processes are accompanied by states of awareness that guide 4 
evaluation of their function and content (Fleming, Dolan, & Frith, 2012; Nelson & 5 
Narens, 1990; Overgaard & Sandberg, 2012). This metacognitive awareness (or 6 
monitoring) is understood as an inferential process, relying on cues derived from the 7 
task at hand to construct judgments about performance (Koriat, 2000), that has 8 
behavioral consequences (Koriat, Ma’ayan, & Nussinson, 2006; Metcalfe & Finn, 2008a). 9 
As such, understanding the basis on which these metacognitive judgments are made is 10 
crucial. While there have been numerous paradigms developed for the study of 11 
metacognition, subjective report from participants remains a vital method for tapping 12 
into metacognitive and related processes (Jersakova, Moulin, & O’Connor, 2016; 13 
Overgaard & Fazekas, 2016). Confidence in particular is the hallmark of metacognitive 14 
judgments and the most commonly used paradigm for investigating metacognition 15 
across domains, ranging from decision making and reasoning (Ackerman & Thompson, 16 
2014; Fletcher & Carruthers, 2012; Yeung & Summerfield, 2012) to perceptual 17 
judgments (Fleming et al., 2015; Peters & Lau, 2015; Rahnev, Koizumi, McCurdy, 18 
D’Esposito, & Lau, 2015) and memory evaluations (Dunlosky, Serra, Matvey, & Rawson, 19 
2005; Finn & Metcalfe, 2007; Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001).  20 
Metacognitive confidence is often interpreted as corresponding to quantity and 21 
quality of some (internal) evidence gathered toward the judgment being made (e.g. ease 22 
of reading as evidence that an item has been sufficiently learned and will later be 23 
remembered; Rhodes & Castel, 2008) and reflecting the probability that the given 24 
judgment is correct (Kepecs & Mainen, 2012). Whereas metacognitive research has 25 
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tended to focus on examining which variables lead to general shifts in confidence (e.g. 1 
Alban & Kelley, 2013; Castel, McCabe, & Roediger, 2007; Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001; 2 
Rhodes & Castel, 2008), there is less understanding of what expressed metacognitive 3 
confidence means. This includes considerations of what differentiates one confidence 4 
level (e.g. 40% confidence) from another (e.g. 60% confidence) and whether confidence 5 
judgments simply rank items against each other or whether they can be further 6 
interpreted (e.g. as yes/no predictions). Understanding this has implications for both 7 
theory and practice and our ability to interpret participant behavior in the laboratory. 8 
In this study we focused on metacognitive judgments made about memory 9 
(metamemory) to investigate what expressed metacognitive confidence represents.  10 
We employed the delayed judgments-of-learning (JOL) paradigm; a prediction of 11 
whether recently learned information would be successfully retrieved in the future 12 
(Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991). In a typical delayed JOL experiment, participants study cue-13 
target word pairs following which they are again presented with the studied cues and 14 
asked to make a prediction about whether they think they would retrieve the target on 15 
the subsequent memory test. These predictions are usually made on a numeric 16 
confidence scale expressed as percentages; e.g. 0%-20-40-60-80-100%. This study 17 
evaluated how participants construct and justify their delayed JOLs by asking them to 18 
provide written reports alongside their JOLs. Participants were given no instructions on 19 
how to write their justifications, as we wanted to see what features would be referenced 20 
spontaneously. We used natural language processing techniques to investigate the type 21 
of information and explanation that characterizes each JOL and differentiates one JOL 22 
from another (e.g. 20% vs. 40%), as well as to quantify the extent to which any two JOLs 23 
are justified with reference to different types of evidence.  24 
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The experiments presented here draw on research investigating retrospective 1 
confidence in contents of memory retrieval, which has established that probing 2 
participants for explanations and justifications of their answers is a powerful tool for 3 
characterizing processes underlying cognition and metacognition. For example, Koriat 4 
et al. (1980) asked participants to list reasons for and against their chosen answer to a 5 
general knowledge question. They observed that confidence was influenced by the 6 
amount of evidence accessed in support of the given answer, lending support to the idea 7 
that confidence is a result of a process of evaluation of different sources of evidence. 8 
More recently, Selmeczy and Dobbins (2014) asked participants to justify their 9 
confidence in recognition judgements. Analysis of these justifications showed a pattern 10 
of results consistent with dual-process accounts of recognition memory (see Yonelinas, 11 
2002); for example, the presence of ‘remembering’ characterized high confidence old 12 
responses and its absence corresponded to high confidence new responses. In other 13 
words, this quantitative analysis of subjective reports lent support to one side of an on-14 
going debate in recognition memory.  15 
Furthermore, these results were obtained without explicit instructions or 16 
theory-laden manipulations from the experimenters, who did not highlight specific 17 
experiences or types of evidence for participants to focus on. This is in contrast to 18 
classic metamemory research, which relies largely on explicitly asking participants 19 
about access to specific types of information relating to the studied items (e.g. the 20 
degree to which they can remember partial characteristics, such as the first letter, of the 21 
target item, Koriat, 1993). Such an approach allows for the evaluation of how access to 22 
specific features of the studied items influences confidence judgments. However, it 23 
leaves open the question whether participants would rely on this type of information in 24 
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their judgments if their attention was not drawn to it by asking (see Hertzog, Fulton, 1 
Sinclair, & Dunlosky, 2014). Overall, studies that have asked participants to justify their 2 
responses (see also Gardiner, Ramponi, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1998; Urquhart & 3 
O’Connor, 2014; Williams, Conway, & Moulin, 2013) indicate that much can be learned 4 
from the relatively infrequent practice of asking participants to explain their 5 
metacognitive judgments. In the present study we adopted and developed the analytical 6 
approach to participant justifications pioneered by Selmeczy and Dobbins (2014) to 7 
gain insight into processes underlying JOL confidence.  8 
Turning specifically to the theoretical issues that could be informed by this 9 
approach, there is a debate about how numeric confidence JOL responses relate to a 10 
binary (yes/no) sub-classification of the scale. The idea that low confidence JOL 11 
predictions should equate to a rejection of future retrieval makes sense probabilistically 12 
(i.e. a 40% predicted success rate should correspond to a 60% predicted failure rate). 13 
Correspondingly, it is common practice to interpret confidence as representing success 14 
probabilities as evidenced by the use of calibration measures (e.g. Finn & Metcalfe, 15 
2007; Koriat, Sheffer, & Ma’ayan, 2002; Serra & England, 2012). Similarly, in cases 16 
where binary data is required for analysis purposes, confidence responses are 17 
commonly split equally into a binary (yes/no) sub-classification (e.g. Hanczakowski, 18 
Zawadzka, Pasek & Higham 2013, Masson & Rotello, 2009).   19 
There is some theoretical support for the idea that participants explicitly make a 20 
yes/no sub-classification in their interpretation of the confidence scale, which has been 21 
suggested for a range of metacognitive tasks (Dunlosky et al., 2005; Liu, Su, Xu, & Chan, 22 
2007). For example, Dunlosky et al. (2005) observed that when participants were asked 23 
to make a confidence judgment about the accuracy of their JOL prediction (a second-24 
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order judgment; SOJ), a plot of the SOJ magnitude against JOL confidence yielded a U-1 
shaped function – participants were most confident in the predictions that lay on the 2 
extremes of the JOL scale (with least confidence at the mid-range of the scale). Dunlosky 3 
et al. (2005) interpreted the SOJ function minimum as the point where yes and no 4 
predictions diverge and suggested that one possible interpretation is that JOLs could be 5 
viewed as a two-step process that consists first of a yes or no judgment, directly 6 
followed by an assignment of confidence.  7 
While the binary yes/no sub-classification seems intuitive and plausible, it has 8 
not yet been directly tested. Further, its relationship to confidence, such as whether we 9 
can split the numerical scale into equal proportion of yes and no responses, is poorly 10 
understood. This is crucial since it is a theory-laden interpretation of JOLs that is 11 
commonly employed in the literature when analyzing confidence data and yet one that 12 
lacks explicit support. This absence of verification of widely held interpretations of how 13 
participants respond highlights the need to understand better how confidence and 14 
binary yes/no judgments relate to each other. 15 
An alternative approach to understanding JOL confidence has been to investigate 16 
the underlying processes that shape the formation of JOLs. The early literature focused 17 
on explaining JOLs as a result of single process (target retrieval) evaluations (e.g. Nelson 18 
& Dunlosky, 1991). In this view, it was assumed that participants accrue one type of 19 
evidence (the degree to which the target is accessible) toward their JOL—the more 20 
evidence they collect, the higher their JOL. According to this view, different JOLs (e.g. 21 
60% as compared to 80%) express different degrees of access to the target. An 22 
alternative two-stage view has proposed a quick pre-retrieval stage driven by cue-23 
familiarity followed by an effortful memory search (target accessibility evaluation; 24 
CONTENT AND CONFIDENCE OF JUDGMENTS-OF-LEARNING 
 
8 
 
Benjamin, 2005).  Metcalfe & Finn (2008b) further elaborated this view, suggesting the 1 
first stage can result in: (i) a quick don’t know decision driven by lack of cue familiarity 2 
(expressed as responding with the lowest point on the JOL scale); or (ii) the initiation of 3 
the second effortful retrieval stage. In this case, there should be qualitatively different 4 
processes that underlie the lowest confidence JOL (i.e. 0%) and distinguish it from all 5 
others. More specifically, it should be a cue-driven evaluation as compared to a target-6 
based judgment. If this holds, we would expect participants to refer to these different 7 
types of evidence in their justifications and to observe a qualitative difference in the 8 
evidence favored at different levels of the JOL scale.  9 
 Thus, there are two modes of understanding JOL confidence; an interpretative 10 
model proposing what confidence represents (a binary yes or no judgment) and a 11 
descriptive model defining what determines a given confidence judgment (e.g. level of 12 
access to the target).  These two views are not irreconcilable; they both suggest there is 13 
an underlying point of divergence in the JOL scale either side of which the scale is 14 
characterized by different processes. The descriptive model (Metcalfe and Finn, 2008b) 15 
places that point on the lowest end of the scale and describe it in terms of the 16 
information evaluation processes that change at that point such that a 0% JOL is a 17 
decision made as the result of a different process (cue familiarity) than the process that 18 
characterizes JOLs on the rest of the scale (target accessibility). In some ways that could 19 
also be interpreted as a yes/no divergence with lack of cue familiarity leading to a 0% 20 
(or a no) judgment and the rest of the scale representing different degrees of a yes 21 
judgment corresponding to different levels of target access. Consistent with this view is 22 
a study by Dougherty, Scheck, Nelson and Narens (2005) who evaluated JOL accuracy at 23 
predicting subsequent item retrieval for all possible JOL dyad comparisons (e.g. 0% JOL 24 
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vs. 20% JOL, 0% JOL vs. 40% JOL and so on for all possible pairings). Dougherty et al. 1 
observed that JOLs predicted which items were subsequently remembered most 2 
accurately when they compared 0% JOLs against all other judgments (20%, 40%, 60%, 3 
80% and 100%) in contrast to any other dyad comparisons. This is consistent with the 4 
idea that 0% JOL represents a rejection of future retrieval whereas all other JOL 5 
responses correspond to a prediction of the item being subsequently retrieved. There is 6 
thus a lot of scope for combining the two views. However, as previously stated, this 7 
position is not reconcilable with the common practice of re-interpreting confidence 8 
responses in binary terms and assigning yes and no labels by splitting the confidence 9 
scale down the middle (the interpretative model, see e.g. Mason & Rotello, 2009).  10 
The aim of the present study was to shed light on what JOL confidence 11 
represents by drawing on and contrasting the interpretative and descriptive models of 12 
delayed JOL confidence. Across all experiments, participants completed a standard 13 
delayed JOL task with cue-target word pairs.  In Experiment 1 participants made JOL 14 
predictions on a 6-point numeric confidence scale (0-20-40-60-80-100%) whereas in 15 
Experiment 2 participants made first a binary yes/no JOL prediction followed by a 3-16 
point verbal confidence judgment made about that prediction (sure-maybe-guess). Thus, 17 
in both experiments there were a total of six JOL response options. In Experiment 3 18 
participants were similarly randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions, 19 
the confidence JOL condition (same response format as in Experiment 1) and the binary 20 
JOL condition (same response format as in Experiment 2). Whereas in Experiment 1 and 21 
2 participants predicted recognition performance when making their JOLs, in 22 
Experiment 3 they predicted recall. This allowed us to test the generalizability of our 23 
findings across different experimental contexts.  24 
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The key novel feature of the present study was that participants provided 1 
written justifications on a subset of their JOLs, which were then analyzed using natural 2 
language processing techniques. Participants were not given any instructions on how to 3 
write their justifications nor did we manipulate any additional variables known to 4 
influence JOL confidence. Three methods of text data analyses (described in more detail 5 
in the Methods section) were used to examine in detail the content of these 6 
justifications as well as evaluate differences between justifications for different JOL 7 
responses. Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) allowed us to evaluate whether the 8 
justifications were more likely to refer to the cue or the target term. This was followed 9 
by an n-gram analysis, which isolates unique phrases that are significantly more likely 10 
to occur in justifications for one JOL category (e.g. 0%) as compared to all others. We 11 
examined these for references to processes such as familiarity and remembering. Lastly, 12 
we used Support Vector Machines (SVMs) to quantify the extent to which two sets of 13 
JOL responses (e.g. no-guess and yes-guess) differed from each other. If different types of 14 
evidence are referenced (e.g. cue familiarity vs. target accessibility) as compared to 15 
levels of access to the same evidence (e.g. different degrees of target access), then 16 
accuracy of SVM classification between them should be high. Metcalfe and Finn (2008b) 17 
make a clear prediction that 0% JOLs should reference the cue (and its lack of 18 
familiarity) whereas other JOL responses should, with increasing confidence, 19 
increasingly focus on the target. This should also lead to high SVM classification 20 
accuracy between justifications written for 0% vs all other confidence JOLs. It is not 21 
clear whether we could expect a similar pattern of results for binary yes/no JOLs. 22 
Altogether, these three analyses allowed us to characterize the content of JOL 23 
justifications, with a focus on the role of the cue and the target, and to also explore 24 
CONTENT AND CONFIDENCE OF JUDGMENTS-OF-LEARNING 
 
11 
 
whether confidence and binary JOLs directly map onto each other (which would be 1 
reflected in a similar pattern of justifications). 2 
In summary, we assessed how participants arrive at JOL confidence 3 
independently and spontaneously without experimentally making any one source of 4 
information (e.g. cue familiarity) more salient than others. We also assessed whether 5 
and how confidence and binary yes/no JOLs compare with each other in terms of the 6 
underlying influences that participants reference in their justifications. This was done in 7 
the context of participants predicting future recognition performance when making 8 
their JOLs (Experiment 1 and 2) and participants predicting recall performance 9 
(Experiment 3). The general procedure and majority of methods adopted to analyse the 10 
text data were modeled on Selmeczy & Dobbins (2014). Within each experiment we 11 
thus examined: (i) how participants justify their JOLs and (ii) to what extent are such 12 
justifications characterized by cue and target references and whether this is consistent 13 
with the descriptive model. Comparing the pattern of justifications for confidence and 14 
binary JOLs allowed us to investigate (iii) whether there is an underlying yes/no sub-15 
classification in numeric JOL confidence responses and, if yes, where it lies. 16 
Investigating both recognition and recall JOL predictions provided an indication of the 17 
replicability and generalizability of our findings to different experimental contexts. 18 
Experiment 1 and 2 19 
Method 20 
Participants 21 
All participants were native English speakers affiliated with the University of Leeds 22 
(students and staff) with 54 participants in Experiment 1 (13 men; mean age = 23.4; SD 23 
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= 7.4) and 73 participants (12 men; mean age = 27.5, SD = 10.7) in Experiment 2.1 In 1 
Experiment 1, two participants were excluded, both for not following instructions (one 2 
for using only 0% and 100% judgements, the other because their written responses 3 
referred to multiple cue-target pairs instead of the pair preceding the written report). 4 
This left 52 participants in the analysis for Experiment 1 (13 men, mean age = 22.5, SD = 5 
6.2). In both experiments, participants either received course credit or £5 as 6 
reimbursement. The study was granted ethical approval by the School of Psychology 7 
Ethics Committee, University of Leeds, UK. 8 
Stimuli 9 
The stimuli used in both experiments were selected from a list of 628 common, 10 
singular English nouns (5-6 letters long) taken from the English Lexicon Project 11 
(minimum log Hyperspace Analogue to Language frequency 8.02; Balota et al., 2007).  12 
For each participant, an algorithm randomly selected words from the list and formed 13 
them into cue-target word-pairs. Each participant was thus exposed to a unique set of 14 
90 cue-target pairs (45 in each of the two experimental blocks). This meant that we did 15 
not control for associative strength between the cue and the target but also that the 16 
observed effects would not be specific to and limited by the nature of the word-pairs 17 
studied.  18 
Procedure 19 
The study was programmed using PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007), with all participants 20 
completing the delayed JOL task individually on a computer, in the presence of the 21 
                                                          
1 The primary data of interest were the written justifications. In both experiments each participant could 
provide at most 3 justifications per JOL type with most participants providing fewer justifications than 
the allowed maximum. Further, participants used some JOL responses more commonly than others. In 
Experiment 2 this was especially pronounced with, for example, the yes-guess JOL response being used 
relatively infrequently by all participants. At the outset of Experiment 2 we decided that we wanted to 
collect at least 100 justifications per JOL response type to make the dataset comparable to Experiment 1. 
This condition and the less evenly distributed nature of JOL responding in Experiment 2 meant that the 
sample size of Experiment 2 was necessarily larger than that of Experiment 1.  
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experimenter. The JOL task is constrained by the number of word-pairs a participant 1 
can be expected to memorize in one session so to collect a sufficient number of JOL 2 
justifications, participants completed the whole task twice in two identical blocks 3 
consisting of three consecutive phases (with no breaks or delays between them, see 4 
Figure 1). In each block participants: (i) studied 45 cue-target pairs-presented for 5 
6000ms each with a fixation cross (500ms) between all trials; (ii) were presented with 6 
the cue of each pair, and gave a JOL predicting performance for the target on the 7 
subsequent recognition memory test2; and (iii) completed a forced choice recognition 8 
test where, on presentation of each cue, they selected the cue-matched target from two 9 
words (both options were targets from the study and each target appeared on the 10 
recognition test twice, once as a lure and once as the correct response). All responses 11 
were made by pressing a key corresponding to the confidence response or target. The 12 
tasks were completed consecutively without any intervening breaks. The order in which 13 
items were presented in each phase of each block was randomized. In each block, 14 
participants were exposed to a different set of 45 cue-target pairs (90 in the whole 15 
experiment).   16 
The only difference between the two experiments was in the JOL stage (part ii of 17 
the procedure). In Experiment 1, participants gave their JOLs on a 6-point numeric 18 
confidence scale (0-20-40-60-80-100%). In Experiment 2, participants first gave a 19 
binary yes/no response indicating whether they would recognize the target, followed by 20 
a 3-point verbal confidence judgment (sure-maybe-guess) relating to the yes/no 21 
response. Thus, in both experiments, there were 6 distinct JOL response options 22 
participants could give.  23 
                                                          
2 The nature of the associative recognition task was made clear to participants as part of the instructions. 
Participants therefore knew what the upcoming memory test was and what they were predicting 
performance for.  
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On a subset of the judgment trials, immediately after giving a JOL, participants 1 
justified the previously rendered JOL using a written, keyboard-entered response. Over 2 
the two blocks participants could give a maximum of 18 justifications (9 per block)—3 3 
per JOL response option. More specifically, no questions were asked on the first five 4 
trials of either block. After that, requests for written justifications were spread out 5 
throughout the judgment task as follows.  If the maximum number of justifications was 6 
reached for a given JOL response type, no more justifications were asked for that 7 
response option. Participants would not be asked for any written responses for the two 8 
trials following a justification, though this enforced gap reduced over the course of the 9 
block (there was no enforced justification gap for the last 10 trials). Some participants 10 
therefore gave fewer judgments than others, especially since some participants used 11 
some JOL responses less than others. On average participants gave 15.4 justifications in 12 
Experiment 1 (SD  = 1.9) and 12.7 justifications in Experiment 2 (SD = 2.7).  13 
<Figure 1> 14 
Text analysis methods 15 
Text data pre-processing. Before any text analysis was carried out, we 16 
corrected spelling mistakes in the text and removed articles (a and the). We also 17 
removed justifications where participants explicitly indicated they wanted to change 18 
the previously rendered JOL response (in total, three justifications in Experiment 1, six 19 
justifications in Experiment 2). In all reported analyses, we aggregated the descriptive 20 
reports for each JOL confidence level and response type across participants for 21 
comparison. A minimum of 102 justifications was collected per JOL type (see Table 1 for 22 
number of justifications collected per JOL response category).  23 
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Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA). LSA is a technique by which one can evaluate 1 
the semantic relationship between a single term and a text document. Drawing on 2 
singular value decomposition (closely related to factor analysis), LSA creates a 3 
mathematical matrix representation of a large body of text, mapping the semantic 4 
relationships between single words and sets of words. This mapping relies on frequency 5 
of co-occurrence but also on a weighting function that takes into account the 6 
‘importance’ of a term to a given text (see Landauer, Foltz & Laham, 1998 for more 7 
detail). LSA that has been trained on a relevant corpus of texts (e.g. general or subject 8 
specific) to create this representation, also called semantic space, can then be applied to 9 
new examples to compute their semantic relationship.  The subsequent classification of 10 
semantic similarities between new examples very closely imitates humans (e.g. Laham, 11 
1997).  12 
The online LSA tool (available at http://lsa.colorado.edu/) offers a semantic 13 
space that has been trained on ‘general reading’ corpus with 300 factors (Dennis, 2006). 14 
We used this to classify the semantic similarity between each justification and the cue-15 
target pair it was written in response to. The toolkit returns a cosine value for each 16 
comparison; as such the range of output values is -1 to 1, with 0 or lower interpreted as 17 
no semantic relationship. Following Wandmacher, Ovchinnikova, and Alexandrov 18 
(2008), we set negative LSA values to 0 since in this context we could not interpret a 19 
justification and a studied item (cue or target) as being more dissimilar than ‘not similar 20 
at all’.  21 
Specifically, we computed an LSA score between the cue and the justification and 22 
compared it against the LSA score computed between the target and the justification. 23 
For example, if a justification for a given JOL response type is more likely to refer to the 24 
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cue than the target (e.g. “I cannot remember studying the word truth” where ‘truth’ is 1 
the cue) then the LSA value should be higher for the cue-justification as compared to the 2 
target-justification comparison. This enabled us to assess whether any JOL category was 3 
characterized by referring more to the cue or the target, as predicted by Metcalfe and 4 
Finn’s (2008b) two-stage JOL account.  5 
Word frequency analysis (n-grams). An n-gram is a continuous series of words 6 
found to occur within a text (n = 1, 2, 3 are referred to as uni-grams, bi-grams and tri-7 
grams respectively). To compare sets of texts (in this case, justifications) the frequency 8 
of occurrence of each n-gram is counted across all justification texts. To account for 9 
some participants writing more than others (and possibly repeating themselves), we 10 
restricted the analysis so that each JOL justification could contribute a maximum of 1 to 11 
any given n-gram count. For any given n-gram (e.g. “do not remember”) we could thus 12 
compute the total number of justifications that contained it for each JOL category.  13 
In previous experiments analysing n-grams (Selmeczy & Dobbins, 2014; 14 
Urquhart & O’Connor, 2014), only two categories with equal probability of occurrence 15 
were ever compared against each other. This was done using a binomial test, computing 16 
a p-value for the proportion of occurrence of the given n-gram under one response 17 
category assuming a binomial distribution with the p-parameter of 0.5. This allowed for 18 
the examination of whether the n-gram was significantly more likely to appear in 19 
justifications for one response category or whether the probability of it occurring in 20 
texts justifying either response category was equal. Here we contrasted each JOL 21 
category (e.g. 0%) against all other JOL categories (e.g. 20%-100%). As such we set the 22 
p-parameter as the number of justifications written in the given category divided by the 23 
total number of justification written within the whole experiment as this better 24 
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reflected the probability of a given n-gram occurring equally likely in any of the 1 
collected justifications. For example, in the case of the 0% JOL, the p-parameter was set 2 
to 127/796. In other words, for each JOL category, we computed whether the 3 
proportion of occurrence (out of all occurrences) of any n-gram was significantly higher 4 
than that n-gram having equal probability of occurrence in justifications of all JOL 5 
response categories.    6 
This analysis allowed the isolation of simple phrases that were most likely to be 7 
used in justifying one JOL response type as compared to all others. Where LSA focused 8 
on semantic similarity between the studied items (cue and target) and the justification 9 
texts, n-gram analysis examined whether different phrases (e.g. relating to familiarity as 10 
compared to retrieval success) would differentiate different JOL response categories. 11 
Rather than analysing information specific to each trial (i.e. whether participants named 12 
or referred to the studied items), this analysis enabled the extraction of general phrases 13 
that held true across trials, irrespective of what the studied cue or target were. In this 14 
way the n-gram analysis complemented, and helped to further explicate, the LSA results. 15 
 Classification analysis (Support Vector Machine [SVM]). SVM is a machine-16 
learning algorithm commonly used in text classification. Here we employed it as a tool 17 
for quantifying the extent to which different JOL responses differed from each other. If 18 
there are highly distinct features that separate one category from another (such as 19 
references characteristic of different processes), then the SVM would pick up on this 20 
and classification of future examples would be highly accurate. On the other hand, if the 21 
differences were merely of degree (e.g. different levels of target access), then the 22 
classification of future examples would be low.  23 
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To carry out SVM analysis, we represented each written justification as a vector 1 
where each vector component corresponded to a uni-gram, bi-gram or tri-gram, with 0 2 
denoting its absence in the given justification text and 1 denoting its presence. We 3 
included all n-grams as this allowed us to account for individual word usage as well as 4 
word combinations, which carry specific semantic meaning. For example, the uni-grams 5 
‘not’, ‘remember’ and ‘confident’ could only be coded as present once which would mark 6 
the texts ‘I am confident I will not remember’ and ‘I am not confident but might 7 
remember’ as the same while including the bigrams ‘not remember’ and ‘not confident’ 8 
avoided this problem. Each n-gram thus constituted an input feature and each text was 9 
represented as a vector of features while the output was the JOL category the given 10 
vector belonged to (e.g. 0%). In principle, an SVM looks for a ‘decision boundary’ or a 11 
line that separates the two sets of data being compared so that the distance between the 12 
boundary and any point of any class is the biggest it can possibly be—that is why it is 13 
called a maximum-margin classifier (Hamel, 2009). Once an SVM has been trained it can 14 
be used to classify new data which will be assigned either of the categories the SVM has 15 
been trained on, based on which side of the margin it falls. 16 
The SVM analysis was implemented with scikit-learn, an open source toolkit 17 
developed for Python (Pedregosa et al., 2011). To compare two JOL response categories 18 
(e.g. 0% vs. 20% JOL), the justification responses for both were labeled and combined. 19 
We trained the classifier on a randomly selected half of the combined data with a linear 20 
kernel and a cost value of 0.10 and tested it on the other half. Once the classifier was 21 
trained, it was then used to classify the remaining half of the data, and its performance 22 
was evaluated by its ability to correctly distinguish the JOL for which a given text was 23 
written.   24 
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The interpretative and descriptive JOL confidence models described in the 1 
Introduction both speculate a divergence on the confidence scale with regards to the 2 
processes that drive the judgment. A difference in processes relied upon (i.e. a 3 
qualitative difference) should lead to high classification accuracy whereas differences 4 
merely of degree (i.e. quantitative differences) should lead to low classification accuracy 5 
due to low likelihood of distinct, differentiating features. 6 
In summary, the LSA allowed us to investigate whether different JOL responses 7 
were more likely to semantically reference the cue or the target. The n-gram analysis on 8 
the other hand allowed us to isolate unique phrases that were significantly more likely 9 
to be used for a JOL response category as compared to all others (e.g. familiarity or 10 
remembering references). Together, these analyses thus allowed us to describe what 11 
types of evidence feed into and differentiate different JOL responses. The SVM analysis 12 
allowed us to quantify the extent to which justifications for any two JOL response 13 
categories differed from each other. If different types of evidence are referenced (e.g. 14 
cue familiarity vs. target accessibility), then classification should be high.  15 
We compared these results against the descriptive model (Metcalfe & Finn, 16 
2008b) which predicts high classification accuracy between the responses at the low 17 
end of the numeric JOL scale (0% vs 20%) with the lowest confidence responses 18 
characterized primarily by cue familiarity and the remaining responses characterized 19 
by differing levels of target access. Contrasting the pattern of responses across the two 20 
response formats allowed us to evaluate the interpretative model which predicts that 21 
the classification accuracy at the boundary between yes and no predictions should be 22 
high and that the justifications for binary JOLs should directly map onto justifications 23 
for the numeric JOL scale in content and character. 24 
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Results 1 
Memory and JOL responses 2 
In Experiment 1, participants correctly recognized 84.7% (SD = 11.6) targets on 3 
the final memory test. In Experiment 2 they correctly recognized 86.2% (SD = 12.2) of 4 
targets. Memory performance did not differ between the two experiments, t(123) = 5 
0.67, p = .507, d = 0.12. 6 
To examine JOL prediction accuracy, in Experiment 1, average JOL confidence 7 
expressed for recognized vs. unrecognized targets was compared. Participants indicated 8 
higher JOL confidence for items they recognized (M = 46.84, SD = 13.82), compared to 9 
items they did not recognize (M = 24.96, SD = 15.88), t(49) = 11.62, p < .001, d = 1.46. To 10 
assess JOL accuracy in Experiment 2, percentage of yes JOL predictions was compared 11 
for recognized vs. unrecognized targets. The results revealed a higher percentage of yes 12 
JOLs for recognized (M = 57.12%, SD = 21.99) as compared to not recognized (M = 13 
28.88%, SD = 28.47) items, t(69) = 10.26, p < .001, d = 1.08. Across both experiments, 14 
overall JOL predictions accurately predicted subsequent memory performance. See 15 
Figure 2 for the mean proportion of trials each JOL category was used and Table 1 for 16 
the number of written justifications collected per JOL category.  17 
<Figure 2> 18 
<Table 1> 19 
Latent semantic analysis (LSA) 20 
 Metcalfe & Finn (2008b) proposed that the lowest point on the JOL confidence 21 
scale should reflect the result of a cue-evaluation stage whereas all other JOL levels 22 
should correspond to target access evaluations. We used LSA to evaluate whether for 23 
each JOL response type, participants were more likely to refer semantically to the cue or 24 
the target in their justifications (or neither). For each trial with a JOL justification, we 25 
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computed an LSA value between the cue and the written justification and compared it 1 
against the LSA value computed between the target and the justification.  Because the 2 
written justifications refer to specific memories, one could expect that overall the 3 
semantic similarity scores would be relatively low. However, if participants refer 4 
specifically to the cue or the target term (or information relating to them) this would 5 
increase the score. Additionally, because LSA has been shown to successfully map to 6 
meaning (Laham, 1997), an increase in the LSA score should be observed even when 7 
participants did not directly refer to the cue or the target but, for example, reported 8 
partial semantic information about them.  We used paired-samples t-tests to compare 9 
the cue-justification and target-justification LSA scores for each JOL response category 10 
(e.g. 0% JOL confidence) to analyze whether the JOL justifications were more likely to 11 
refer to the cue or the target term. The LSA scores range from 0 (no relationship) to 1 12 
(high semantic relationship). This analysis was done for both Experiment 1 and 2 13 
separately with the results reported in Table 2. 14 
<Table 2> 15 
 The results of the LSA revealed that in Experiment 1, the 0% and 20% JOL 16 
confidence level justifications were significantly more likely to semantically refer to the 17 
cue than the target. On the other hand, the 100% level was more significantly likely to 18 
refer to the target than the cue. The pattern of results of Experiment 2 showed it was 19 
the guess responses (for both no and yes predictions) that were significantly more likely 20 
to refer semantically to the cue rather than the target term. These results demonstrate 21 
that participants rely on both cue and target related information in justifying their JOLs 22 
and that these two types of processes provide a useful framework for differentiating 23 
different types of JOL predictions. To understand more precisely whether the cue-24 
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references were the same or differed between the different JOL responses we turned to 1 
word-frequency analysis.   2 
Word-frequency analysis 3 
The next step in the analyses was the examination of unique phrases that 4 
differentiated one JOL response from all others. This allowed us to determine whether 5 
the cue references in JOL justifications were of the same character (e.g. expressing lack 6 
of cue familiarity) or whether they relied on the cue term differently (e.g. cue familiarity 7 
characterizing 20% whereas its absence characterizing 0% JOL). Further, whereas LSA 8 
only tracked semantic similarity, participants could express lack of cue familiarity 9 
without naming the cue itself (e.g. “This cue is not familiar”). Compared to LSA, n-gram 10 
analysis thus allowed us to capture these types of phrases and extract meaningful 11 
patterns of expression across trials that were significantly more likely to occur for one 12 
type of JOL response as compared to others. For example, we expected to see an 13 
increase in recollection-specific terminology with increases in JOL confidence as well as 14 
greater use of intensity modifiers indicating greater certainty of access.   15 
To constrain the number of n-grams analysed, we focused only on bi-grams and 16 
tri-grams with a minimum total occurrence of 10 (stricter than previous analyses which 17 
have included uni-grams and used lower median occurrences). We only reported tri-18 
grams and bi-grams reaching significance at p < .05 (Table 3 reports n-gram analysis 19 
results for Experiment 1, Table 4 for Experiment 2). For each JOL, the analysis extracted 20 
phrases that occurred significantly more often than would be expected if the phrase was 21 
used equally across all JOL responses. Notably, this does not preclude the possibility 22 
that certain phrases might have significantly higher proportion of occurrence for two 23 
JOL category responses (e.g. if they never occurred for any other response) and thus 24 
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allows for extraction of similarities (e.g. are there certain phrases that characterize no 1 
predictions that are never employed in yes predictions) as well as the expected 2 
characterization of differences. 3 
<Table 3> 4 
The n-gram analysis results presented in Table 3 show the 0% JOL confidence 5 
level was characterized by an inability to remember (“do not remember”) and could be 6 
interpreted as expressing lack of cue familiarity as participants indicated they cannot 7 
even remember having seen the presented word at study (“not remember seeing”). The 8 
20% JOL confidence level on the other hand was characterized by a vague sense of cue 9 
familiarity (“vaguely remember seeing [word]”) accompanied by a lack of recollection 10 
for the target term (“but cannot remember”… “what it was”). While the LSA results 11 
revealed that the 0% and 20% JOL confidence levels were more likely to refer to the cue 12 
than the target term semantically, the n-gram analysis showed they nevertheless 13 
differed from each other in whether the cue term was said to be remembered. The 40% 14 
JOL also referenced cue familiarity (“I remember seeing”) suggesting the role of the cue 15 
in JOLs isn’t isolated to lowest confidence responses when it isn’t familiar but can in 16 
itself provide a degree of evidence when the target cannot be accessed. Indeed, 17 
justifications for the 40% and 60% JOL confidence levels expressed feelings of possible 18 
target access (“I think I”… “could recognise”… “but cannot recall”) whereas the 80% JOL 19 
confidence level started bringing in language of certainty (“pretty sure”) and memory 20 
for associations (“I associated”). Unsurprisingly, the 100% JOL expressed memory for 21 
the target term (“I can remember”). All in all, this pattern of descriptions fits with 22 
Metcalfe and Finn’s (2008b) suggestions that a lack of cue familiarity leads to a 0% JOL 23 
confidence response whereas, when the cue is recognized, the JOL confidence increases 24 
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with increase in target access. The results further demonstrated that the role of the cue 1 
does not stop after that initial stage and is carried as evidence through to the target 2 
access stage. 3 
<Table 4> 4 
 As seen in Table 4, the types of descriptions for the highest confidence no and yes 5 
responses respectively correspond to 0% (e.g. “cannot remember”) and 100% (e.g. “I 6 
remember”) responses of Experiment 1. It is noteworthy that the high numeric 7 
confidence JOLs and yes JOL predictions refer to not just the target, but also memory for 8 
the “word association” or “link between” the items. This supports recent findings that 9 
memory for associations made between the cue and the target at study influences 10 
metacognitive confidence (Hertzog et al., 2014) and demonstrates that this is true even 11 
when participants are not instructed to use any specific memory techniques in learning 12 
the cue-target pairs. 13 
The guess responses (for both yes and no JOL predictions), were relatively low on 14 
unique n-gram use compared to most of the other JOLs. The LSA results revealed that 15 
participants were more likely to reference the cue than the target for these responses 16 
but the n-gram results are not clear as to which way this was. However, the tri-gram 17 
“not remember seeing” occurred 10 times in justifications for the no-guess responses 18 
(with further 12 occurrences for no – sure and 9 occurrences for no – maybe out of a 19 
total of 32 occurrences). Altogether, this shows that references to lack of cue familiarity 20 
were primarily reserved for no JOL predictions. Consequently, it seems likely that if 21 
there is a distinction between yes and no predictions, it is in whether the cue feels 22 
familiar or not. 23 
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Nevertheless, the results indicate a less clearly defined distinction between yes 1 
and no responses than some (e.g. Dunlosky et al., 2005) would predict. Guess 2 
predictions (which here capture low magnitude SOJs) might just be what the term 3 
suggests—instances where participants do not feel strongly predisposed toward a yes 4 
or a no prediction and rather the evidence available to them (or its lack) makes them 5 
uncertain about the future retrieval status of the items they are evaluating. If anything, 6 
this highlights the usefulness of allowing participants to express uncertainty. If one 7 
were to interpret the character of the yes/no sub-classification, it is the closest to the 8 
differentiation between 0 and 20% JOL.  9 
Lastly, some phrases were almost equally likely for all no predictions. Namely “I 10 
do not”, “do not remember”, “cannot remember” and “not remember seeing”. This 11 
indicates that participants were less clear on how to differentiate the three no response 12 
types from each other and were inclined towards using similar responses across all 13 
three confidence levels associated with no predictions. Together with the results from 14 
Experiment 1, these results suggest that if there is an underlying yes/no sub-15 
classification in the JOL confidence scale, it is likely located at the low-end of a numeric 16 
scale, with most of the scale above this point consistent with use of yes predictions. This 17 
is consistent with framing effects which suggest that participants primarily accrue 18 
evidence toward a yes prediction as indicated by their judgments being swayed by 19 
whether the question is phrased in terms of forgetting or remembering (Finn, 2008; 20 
Koriat, Bjork, Sheffer, & Bar, 2004; Serra & England, 2012).   21 
Support vector machine (SVM) analysis 22 
Our final analysis was to evaluate the extent to which the written justifications 23 
for any two JOL response types were quantifiably distinct.  Within each experiment, we 24 
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trained SVM classifiers to compare each JOL category against all other JOL categories. If 1 
two JOL categories were justified by referring to different types of evidence, then 2 
classification accuracy for distinguishing the two categories would be good. The results 3 
are reported in Table 5, which presents overall SVM classifier performance for all JOL 4 
categories expressed as percentage of examples classified correctly.3 5 
<Table 5> 6 
 Examining all adjacent JOL confidence levels, Experiment 1 revealed that the 0% 7 
and 20% JOLs were classified with above chance accuracy (50%; X2(1) = 20.04, p < .001) 8 
and with the highest degree of accuracy of all adjacent levels. Indeed, this performance 9 
was significantly higher than the classification performance comparing the next 10 
numeric categories, the 20% vs 40% JOL comparison (X2(1) = 9.38, p = .003). This 11 
would agree with the proposal of the descriptive model of JOL confidence that if there is 12 
a divergence in processes relied on in making the judgments, it is located between the 13 
lowest two points on the scale (Metcalfe & Finn, 2008b). All other JOL confidence levels 14 
would appear to be graded variations of a similar process (the highest classification 15 
accuracy between all the other adjacent responses of 60.32% was not significantly 16 
different from chance performance of 50%; X2(1) = 2.31, p = .129). 17 
In Experiment 2, the highest adjacent classification accuracy was between yes-18 
maybe and yes-sure predictions, which was significantly higher than the classification 19 
                                                          
3 We also used SVMs to compare justifications in the first and second block of each experiment. If the SVM 
classifier performed significantly well in classifying responses as either belonging to block 1 or block 2 of 
an experiment, this could suggest the justifications were substantially different across the two blocks. It is 
more than likely that there were some differences between the two blocks as participants completing the 
second block had experience with the entire experimental task. Using SVMs allowed us to quantify this 
difference. We compared the classifier performance to chance (50%) and found that in Experiment 1 
classification accuracy (56.7%) was not above chance, X2(1) = 3.41, p = .065. In Experiment 2 
classification accuracy for comparing justifications between the two blocks was similarly low (57.3%) 
although this time the comparison was statistically above chance, X2(1) = 4.62, p = .032. Given the 
relatively low classification accuracy however, we do not believe this to be a problem, especially as all text 
analyses collapsed data across blocks. 
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accuracy between the yes and no prediction boundary (i.e. the guess responses); X2(1) = 1 
11.87, p < .001. This is consistent with the n-gram results which showed there were few 2 
distinct features (bi-grams and tri-grams) characterizing the guess responses but 3 
contrary to the prediction that yes vs. no predictions should be distinct and so highly 4 
classifiable (e.g. Dunlosky et al., 2005). 5 
 In contrast to Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 classification accuracy for all 6 
adjacent JOL responses was above chance even when relatively low (e.g. 62.4%, X2(1) = 7 
4.16, p < .05). Markedly, the highest classification accuracies were at the terminal ends 8 
of the scale contrasting high confidence response (yes and no) against their adjacent 9 
medium confidence responses. This is also in contrast to Experiment 1 where we 10 
observed high classification accuracy only at the low end of numeric JOL scale. It is clear 11 
the response profiles between the JOL scales are different. Whereas the numeric 12 
confidence scale does not lead to clearly defined adjacent response boundaries (except 13 
for at the lowest end of the scale), the binary yes/no sub-classification scale (Experiment 14 
2) leads to more clearly defined categories of responses. If participants treated most (if 15 
not all) of the numeric JOL confidence scale in Experiment 1 as accumulation of 16 
evidence toward a yes prediction then it follows that the JOL confidence levels were 17 
more clearly defined when there were fewer options provided for a positive prediction 18 
as was the case in Experiment 2. This is in line with other research (e.g. Finn, 2008; 19 
Koriat, Bjork, Sheffer, & Bar, 2004) which has shown that participants need to be asked 20 
to predict their own forgetting to treat the confidence scale as also expressing the 21 
degree to which they might forget (i.e. a no prediction) as compared to only the degree 22 
to which they might remember (or what we would classify as a yes prediction).  23 
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Indeed, the no responses of Experiment 2 were less clearly demarcated (as 1 
compared to the yes predictions). The average classification accuracy between all the no 2 
responses (68%) was significantly lower than the average classification accuracy 3 
between all the yes responses (78%), X2(1)  = 13.35, p < .001). As we saw from the n-4 
gram analysis, there was a great deal of overlap between the n-grams participants used 5 
as a way of classifying their no predictions. Overall, it seems that in a paradigm where 6 
participants aim to predict their remembering, they struggle to differentiate between 7 
different levels of forgetting. This is again consistent with the idea that participants 8 
would primarily focus on the familiarity of the cue as a way of rejecting future target 9 
memory. Cue familiarity is a less varied type of signal than the more heterogeneous 10 
nature of different levels and types of target access that would be thought to 11 
characterize the unique yes JOL predictions.  12 
 Most relevant in regards to the current study, the classification pattern for the 13 
two response formats is clearly different. This suggests that while there is a distinction 14 
in the types of processes driving JOL confidence responses, it might be troublesome 15 
trying to assign them a discrete no vs yes prediction status. Rather, the two response 16 
formats might encourage related but nevertheless different modes of evaluation.  17 
Experiment 3 18 
 In Experiment 3 we examined how the findings of Experiment 1 and 2 compared 19 
to a JOL task where participants predicted recall rather than recognition. Delayed JOL 20 
tasks commonly employ a cued-recall rather than a cued-recognition task and as such 21 
the question of the generalizability of Experiment 1 and 2 findings to recall JOL 22 
predictions is particularly pertinent. Further, while memory research has long 23 
established that performance on these two memory tasks can substantially differ 24 
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(MacDougall, 1904) with recognition performance generally superior to recall 1 
performance (although see Tulving & Thomson, 1973), the metacognitive literature has 2 
not truly examined the extent to which participants are sensitive to these differences 3 
when making their metacognitive judgments.  4 
The key question of Experiment 3 was whether the patterns of metacognitive 5 
justifications for the two JOL response formats established using the recognition JOL 6 
task of Experiments 1 and 2 would persist during recall JOL predictions. Experiment 3 7 
thus allowed us to examine the generalizability of our findings to other contexts. In 8 
contrast to Experiments 1 and 2, Experiment 3 consisted of two groups; the numeric 9 
confidence JOL group using the same JOL response method as in Experiment 1 and the 10 
binary JOL group using the same JOL response method as Experiment 2. We expected 11 
that the pattern of results in Experiment 3 would be in line with those of Experiments 1 12 
and 2 given the only key difference in method was that participants were predicting 13 
recall rather than recognition. 14 
Method 15 
Participants 16 
 All 64 participants were native English speakers and randomly assigned to one 17 
of two experimental conditions. Six participants were excluded from data analysis 18 
because they did not follow the instructions when writing their justifications (e.g. 19 
referring to multiple items rather than only to the JOL given on the last trial.  This left 58 20 
participants (19 men, mean age = 21.3, SD = 2.7). Of those, 28 were in the numeric 21 
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confidence JOL condition and 30 in the binary JOL condition.4 The participants were all 1 
students at the University of St Andrews and received £5 as reimbursement for taking 2 
part in the study. The study was granted ethical approval by the University Teaching 3 
and Research Ethics Committee at the University of St Andrews. 4 
Stimuli and Procedure 5 
 The stimuli were the same as those used in Experiment 1 and 2. The procedure 6 
was also mostly identical to that used in the previous experiments. Half of the 7 
participants gave their JOLs as numeric confidence (as in Experiment 1), and the other 8 
half gave their JOLs as binary (yes/no) predictions followed by verbal confidence (as in 9 
Experiment 2). The key difference in Experiment 3 was that participants predicted and 10 
were tested on memory recall as compared to recognition. We also increased the 11 
maximum number of justifications a participant could provide given that participants in 12 
Experiment 1 and 2 ended up providing significantly fewer justifications than the set 13 
maximum number. In Experiment 3 participants, on average, provided 19.8 14 
justifications in the numeric confidence JOL group and 19.9 justifications in the binary 15 
JOL group. 16 
Results 17 
Memory and JOL performance 18 
Participants correctly recalled 37.7% (SD = 21.4) of items in the numeric 19 
confidence JOL condition and 36.5% (SD = 21.2) of targets in the binary JOL condition. 20 
                                                          
4 In Experiment 1 and 2 participants on average provided fewer justifications than the allowed maximum, 
leading to a need for larger sample sizes. We compensated for this in Experiment 3 by increasing the cap 
on the maximum justifications any one given participant could provide, thus allowing for faster data 
collection with fewer participants. 
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Memory performance did not differ between the two groups, t(56) = 0.22, p = .828, d = 1 
0.06. 2 
To verify that JOL predictions were accurate we compared JOLs for items that 3 
were recalled with items that were not recalled. In the numeric confidence JOL group, 4 
participants gave higher confidence JOLs (M = 84.75%, SD = 13.44) when they 5 
subsequently recalled the target as compared to when they did not (M = 21.58%, SD = 6 
14.75).  Similarly, in the binary JOL group participants gave a higher percentage of yes 7 
JOL predictions to items that were subsequently recalled (M = 88.54%, SD = 21.52) as 8 
compared to items that were not recalled (M = 24.76%, SD = 19.84). A group (numeric 9 
confidence JOL, binary JOL) x target recall (recalled, unrecalled) ANOVA confirmed that 10 
while JOLs were higher for recalled as compared to unrecalled targets, F(1, 56) = 11 
557.86, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 =  .91, this did not differ between groups, F(1, 56) = 0.82, p = .368, 12 
𝜂𝑝
2 =  .02, and there was no interaction between the two factors, F(1, 56) = 0.01, p = 13 
.911, 𝜂𝑝
2 <  .001.  14 
See Figure 2 for the mean proportion of trials each JOL category was used, and 15 
Table 6 for the number of written justifications collected per JOL category. Figure 2 16 
clearly shows that when making recall predictions in Experiment 3, participants were 17 
more likely to use JOL responses at the extreme ends of the scales (i.e. 0% and 100% 18 
JOLs and no-sure and yes-sure JOLs) than all other responses. This was not the case in 19 
Experiments 1 and 2 (where participants predicted recognition), where the JOL 20 
responses were more evenly distributed across all available options.  21 
<Table 6> 22 
 23 
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Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) 1 
 See Table 7 for results of LSA applied to Experiment 3 justifications.   2 
<Table  7> 3 
 Starting with the confidence JOL responses, as in Experiment 1 participants 4 
referred to the cue more than the target in the 0% and 20% JOL justifications. In 5 
Experiment 3, the participant responses also exhibited this pattern in the 40% JOL 6 
justifications, which was not the case in Experiment 1. Note that in Experiment 1 7 
participants also referenced the target more than the cue in justifications of 100% JOL 8 
responses, which was not the case for the confidence JOL group in Experiment 3.  9 
 In contrast, turning to the binary JOL group, there were substantial differences 10 
between LSA results for this group and LSA results of Experiment 2. In Experiment 2 11 
participants referenced the cue more than the target in justifications of no-guess and 12 
yes-guess JOL responses. In Experiment 3 we observed this pattern for the no-sure and 13 
no-maybe justifications. As such the justifications of the binary JOL group in Experiment 14 
3 matched quite closely those of the confidence JOL group of Experiment 3 and 15 
Experiment 1 justifications in the semantic references made to the cue term.  16 
Word-frequency analysis 17 
 See Table 8 for n-gram results for the confidence JOL group and Table 9 for n-18 
gram results of the binary JOL group. 19 
<Table 8> 20 
As in Experiment 1, the n-gram results for the confidence JOL group showed that 21 
for 0% JOLs participants were more likely to indicate they do “not remember seeing 22 
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[the cue]” whereas for the 20% JOLs they were more likely to write  “I remember seeing 1 
[the cue]”. That they were referring to the cue is supported by the LSA results which 2 
showed that participants were more likely to semantically reference the cue than the 3 
target in their justifications of 0% and 20% JOLs. There is thus again an indication that 4 
the demarcation of these two responses was primarily in cue familiarity. All other levels 5 
were less clear but seemed to reference possible target access (e.g. “think I remember”, 6 
“remember paired word”) and were primarily differentiated by words indicating 7 
certainty (e.g. “vague” for 40% vs. “clearly” for 100% JOL justifications).   8 
<Table 9> 9 
 As in Experiment 2, the no-sure responses in the binary JOL group echoed the 0% 10 
JOL responses (“not remember seeing [the cue]”) while the yes-sure justifications were 11 
similar to the 100% justifications (using words such as “clearly”, “associated”, 12 
“imagined”). However, the reference to lack of cue familiarity (“not remember seeing”) 13 
was almost exclusive to the no-sure responses in the binary JOL group in Experiment 3, 14 
as compared to being shared by all no JOL justifications, as was the case in Experiment 15 
2. The no-maybe and no-guess responses focused on inaccessibility of the target (“but I 16 
cannot”…”remember word”). The yes responses, in contrast, referenced partial 17 
accessibility of the target such as a general awareness of what it was about and that it 18 
might be possible to access it.  19 
 20 
 21 
 22 
 23 
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Support vector machine (SVM) analysis 1 
 See Table 5 for results of the SVM analyses carried out on the confidence JOL and 2 
binary JOL group responses.5 Overall, the pattern of classification performance was 3 
lower than that observed in Experiments 1 and 2 and there were no categories of JOL 4 
justification responses that were classified with above 90% accuracy. Despite that, the 5 
data from Experiment 3 showed the same general pattern of results as observed in 6 
Experiments 1 and 2. The pattern of classifications between the two JOL response 7 
formats differed while the confidence JOL group’s justifications mapped onto those of 8 
Experiment 1 and the justifications of the binary JOL group mapped onto those of 9 
Experiment 2.  10 
The SVM classification results for the confidence JOL group were very similar to 11 
those of Experiment 1 which also employed the numerical confidence JOL scale for 12 
participants’ predictions. The 0% JOL justifications were most clearly demarcated in 13 
contrast to all other JOL justifications and the 0% vs. 20% JOL classification was the 14 
highest from among all adjacent level JOL justification classifications. The 77.06% 15 
classification accuracy was above chance (50%), X2(1) = 16.15, p < .001. As in 16 
Experiment 1, the next highest classification accuracy for adjacent JOL levels 17 
(comparing 80% and 100% JOL justifications) was not above chance, X2(1) = 3.06, p = 18 
.080. 19 
                                                          
5 As in previous experiments, we also trained an SVM classifier to compare justifications written for block 
1 and block 2 of the experiment. We carried out this comparison for each experimental group separately. 
This allowed us to evaluate whether the justifications written between the two blocks were quantitatively 
different. This would be reflected in significantly above chance (50%) classifier performance. In the 
numeric confidence JOL group, the SVM classification accuracy (56.48%) for justifications written in the 
two blocks was not significantly above chance, X2(1) = 2.48, p = .115. The same was true for classification 
accuracy of the binary JOL group responses (52.5%), X2(1) = 0.26, p = .612 
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 In contrast, the binary JOL justifications were mostly defined for yes-sure as 1 
compared to all other JOL categories, with the yes-sure vs. yes-maybe classification 2 
accuracy being the highest of all comparisons made for JOLs adjacent to each other 3 
(again corresponding to Experiment 2 results). While this classification performance 4 
was also numerically higher than that between yes-guess and no-guess responses, this 5 
time the comparison of classification accuracy between yes-sure vs. yes-maybe and yes-6 
guess vs. no-guess responses was not statistically significantly different, X2(1) = 3.23, p = 7 
.072. However, the classification accuracy for comparisons of yes-guess and no-guess 8 
responses was not above chance (50%), X2(1) = 0.47, p = .49. Lastly, as in Experiment 2, 9 
justifications for all the yes JOLs were overall more clearly defined between each other 10 
than justifications for the no JOLs, as indicated by a higher overall classification 11 
accuracy (69.93% vs. 57.20%), X2(1) = 9.76, p = .002. 12 
Summary 13 
 The only key methodological difference between Experiment 3 and Experiments 14 
1 and 2 was that when making a JOL, participants predicted future recall rather than 15 
recognition performance. Other than this change in the JOL task, procedures within the 16 
confidence and binary JOL groups in Experiment 3 were designed to replicate the 17 
procedures in Experiments 1 and 2 respectively. We were primarily interested in 18 
observing whether the pattern of results of Experiments 1 and 2, speaking to the lack of 19 
direct correspondence between the two JOL response formats, would generalize from a 20 
JOL task using recognition to a JOL task using cued recall.  21 
The pattern of results from the confidence JOL group matched that observed in 22 
Experiment 1. There were some minor exceptions, the most notable being within the 23 
LSA results, which showed that participants in the confidence JOL group in Experiment 24 
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3 were more likely to reference the cue as compared to the target when expressing 40% 1 
JOL confidence, which was not the case in Experiment 1. Other than this slight 2 
difference, which is not in conflict with the descriptive model, it appears that 3 
participants predicting recall performance used the confidence scale in a comparable 4 
manner to participants predicting recognition. 5 
 There were more differences observed between the binary JOL group here and in 6 
Experiment 2. This was especially true for the LSA results. In Experiment 2 participants 7 
were more likely to reference the cue (as compared to the target) in justifications of yes-8 
guess and no-guess JOLs. In the binary JOL group in Experiment 3 we observed this 9 
pattern of results for no-sure and no-maybe responses, aligning these binary results with 10 
those of the confidence JOL responses.  11 
Nevertheless, the remainder of the results from this final experiment confirmed 12 
that the two JOL response formats were not used analogously, establishing that for both 13 
recognition and recall JOL predictions, binary JOLs did not directly map onto numeric 14 
confidence JOL responses. For example, the SVM results showed repeatedly that for 15 
confidence results the clearest demarcation was between 0% JOL confidence and all 16 
other responses whereas for binary responses it was yes-sure JOL (what in confidence 17 
terms could be interpreted as 100% JOL confidence) that seems to be most distinct from 18 
all other justifications, as reflected in high classification accuracy. Confidence judgments 19 
have a clear distinction whereby 0% represents lack of cue familiarity whilst most of the 20 
scale represents degrees of target access, such that the high confidence responses are in 21 
fact relatively similar. Binary JOLs on the other hand seem to have more clearly 22 
demarcated yes JOL categories than no JOL categories, with clearer differences between 23 
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different levels of confidence assigned to these yes JOL predictions (along the lines of 1 
sure-maybe-guess used in this series of experiments).  2 
General Discussion 3 
Within any metacognitive paradigm, aspects of the task are manipulated so that specific 4 
information is made salient to participants; in metamemory tasks this is usually through 5 
encoding or retrieval instructions. The question that arises is whether the information 6 
that is shown to influence metacognitive judgments in such paradigms remains relevant 7 
in other contexts (see for example Hertzog et al., 2014). This study asked: what 8 
information do participants consider relevant to their JOLs in the absence of any such 9 
manipulation and how does this information map onto the interpretative and 10 
descriptive models of delayed JOLs? More specifically, we investigated written 11 
justifications for numeric confidence and binary (yes/no) JOL predictions. Participants 12 
completed a standard JOL task and on some trials were asked to justify their 13 
predictions, which were subsequently analysed using a range of natural language 14 
processing techniques. The results showed that (i) participants could justify their 15 
metacognitive judgments, (ii) numeric confidence JOL justifications mapped broadly 16 
onto the descriptive two-stage model (Metcalfe & Finn, 2008b) as they referenced both 17 
cue and target related information, (iii) numeric confidence JOLs had different 18 
characteristics to binary yes/no JOLs, thus challenging the interpretative model 19 
assuming that numeric confidence JOLs can consistently be sub-classified into equal 20 
proportion of yes/no judgments. 21 
Overall, participants could justify their JOLs and did so with reference to both 22 
cue- and target-related information as well as with reference to associations they made 23 
between them. This was the case even though we did not manipulate these factors or 24 
instruct participants in any way as to how they should learn the items and what 25 
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information they should focus on when making their JOLs. The results thus complement 1 
studies which have shown that emphasis on cue, target and associative information 2 
shifts metacognitive confidence (Benjamin, 2005; Hertzog et al., 2014; Metcalfe & Finn, 3 
2008b) and support the heuristics view of metacognitive judgments as based on 4 
evidence accumulation processes (Brewer, Marsh, Clark-Foos, & Meeks, 2010; Koriat, 5 
2000).  6 
The results of numeric confidence JOLs were consistent with the predictions of 7 
Metcalfe and Finn (2008b). The 0% and 20% JOL responses were the most divergent of 8 
any adjacent JOL confidence levels as indicated by highest classification accuracy. The 9 
content analyses supported the idea that, whereas the 0% JOLs corresponded to a lack 10 
of cue familiarity, the 20% JOLs were given to items whose cue was familiar but whose 11 
target was not accessible. All other JOL confidence levels reflected an increase in target 12 
accessibility. We therefore provide support for a descriptive model of JOL confidence as 13 
resulting from a two-stage evaluation, with interrogation of different evidence 14 
characterizing each stage. 15 
The results of Experiment 2 suggested that participants referred to the cue to 16 
distinguish between a no and some degree of a yes response as well as to characterize 17 
high confidence no responses from all other responses. This would map onto the 18 
differences between 0% and 20%, suggesting that if there is an underlying yes/no sub-19 
classification in the numeric JOL confidence scale, it is a differentiation of the lowest 20 
confidence responses only. Consistent with this, there was also an indication that 21 
participants struggled to differentiate the three degrees of no confidence prediction 22 
from each other, at least when framed in terms of remembering. The degrees of yes 23 
prediction were more clearly demarcated. However, the overarching distinction 24 
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between yes and no predictions was less clear-cut than predicted by the interpretative 1 
model and it remains questionable whether binary yes/no sub-classification reflects 2 
how participants approach the JOL confidence scale.  3 
The overall pattern of results was confirmed in Experiment 3 where participants 4 
predicted future recall rather than recognition when making their JOLs. There were also 5 
some minor differences between Experiment 2 and the binary JOL group in Experiment 6 
3, especially in the LSA results where the binary JOL group resembled, at least in some 7 
aspects, results of the confidence JOL group. It is very likely that the exact 8 
interpretations of the confidence scale and the use of the two JOL response formats will 9 
differ somewhat between different tasks and even between two studies using the same 10 
task.  This was particularly clear in Figure 2 which showed the average proportion of 11 
trials on which each JOL response (e.g. 0% or yes-maybe) was used.  In Experiment 3, 12 
when making recall JOL predictions, both numeric confidence and binary JOL responses 13 
favoured the extreme ends of the scale (i.e. 0% and 100% JOL and no-sure and yes-sure 14 
JOLs). This was not the case in Experiments 1 and 2 where participants predicted 15 
recognition and, on average, used the JOL responses available to them more evenly. 16 
Altogether, results of the experiments presented here suggest that the use of these 17 
response formats is unlikely to be completely fixed and will depend on experimental 18 
design and context.  19 
It is clear that analogous points on numeric confidence and binary sub-20 
classification 6-point scales are not always equivalent—we cannot treat the numeric 21 
JOL confidence scale as evenly corresponding to the sub-classifications within yes and 22 
no responses. It is possible that this might be true in some cases but it first needs to be 23 
established, it cannot be assumed. The experiments presented here showed that across 24 
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the two scales, the terminal points corresponded, i.e. a 0% JOL was equivalent to a high 1 
confidence no and a 100% JOL was equivalent to a high confidence yes. It is unsurprising 2 
that our understanding of the extremes of the scale might be correct. However, these 3 
extremes differed in how they related to the mid-range responses and this is where we 4 
observed the most differences. The overall different pattern of JOL justifications across 5 
the two response formats highlights that participants do not use all points of the two 6 
scales in the same way. For example, asking participants to first give a yes/no judgment 7 
followed by a confidence assignment, seems to have led to more clearly demarcated 8 
categories of responses than was the case with the numeric confidence scale. This 9 
contradicts the idea that participants interpret the numeric confidence scale in terms of 10 
a binary yes/no sub-classification. 11 
This lack of equivalence is worth highlighting, especially as there is an 12 
underlying assumption in much metacognitive research that confidence judgments are 13 
probabilistic. It is common, for example, to interpret 0%, 20% and 40% as no 14 
predictions. This is seen particularly in assessments of metacognitive accuracy in terms 15 
of calibration; an assessment of whether metacognitive judgments correspond exactly 16 
to performance (perfect calibration would be if items given 60% JOLs were recognized 17 
at a rate of 60% in subsequent memory tests etc.). Considerable research has focused on 18 
what drives poor calibration which is observed across domains (see for example Finn & 19 
Metcalfe, 2007; Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbolting, 1991; Koriat, Lichtenstein, & 20 
Fischhoff, 1980; Koriat, Ma’ayan, Sheffer, & Bjork, 2006; Kornell & Bjork, 2009). 21 
However, recently Hanczakowski et al. (2013; see also Zawadzka & Higham, 2015) 22 
showed that the common observation that participants tend to display underconfidence 23 
in terms of calibration (i.e. lower average confidence JOL than overall memory 24 
performance) was not observed with a yes/no response format and when the 25 
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proportion of yes responses was used to assess calibration. Hanczakowski et al. 1 
interpreted this as indicating that participants were not truly underconfident as has 2 
been previously assumed and that the results could rather be explained as driven by 3 
misunderstanding of how participants treat the JOL confidence scale. This was observed 4 
using an immediate JOL task where predictions are made during study rather than after 5 
all items have been learned as is the case with delayed JOLs employed here. 6 
Nevertheless, the finding is consistent with the suggestion from the current study that 7 
participants are treating most of the JOL confidence scale as a yes prediction. In most 8 
likelihood, the anchoring of a confidence scale shifts between participants and across 9 
tasks.   10 
This further relates to findings that question format influences how participants 11 
respond in both metacognitive (Finn, 2008; Serra & England, 2012) and recognition 12 
memory tasks (Mill & O’Connor, 2014). For example, participants anchored their JOLs 13 
lower on the JOL confidence scale when judging future remembering as compared to 14 
forgetting (Serra & England, 2012). Similarly, recognition judgments for whether an 15 
item has been studied or is seen for the first time have been shown to be influenced by 16 
whether the question is termed in terms of judging ‘oldness’ or ‘novelty’ (Mill & 17 
O’Connor, 2014). More specifically, participants shifted their response bias to more 18 
likely disconfirm the question asked (more likely to respond ‘new’ when asked ‘old?’). 19 
This study adds to a newly growing literature demonstrating that, in addition to 20 
question format, response format also influences participant responding in 21 
metacognitive tasks (Jersakova et al., 2016; Overgaard & Sandberg, 2012). Taken 22 
together, the evidence indicates that the methods used to assess cognitive and 23 
metacognitive phenomena are of theoretical importance, with direct consequences for 24 
the inferences we draw from our data.  25 
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 Lastly, we acknowledge that it is possible that asking participants to justify their 1 
responses might alter the nature of the JOL task. Indeed, this is a problem present 2 
throughout metacognition studies, which often require participants to make explicit 3 
reports of the processes under investigation (e.g. by responding to questions such as 4 
‘Can you remember the first letter of an unrecalled word?’), thus always leaving the 5 
question open whether the same results would be obtained if participants were not 6 
asked to reflect on their retrieval experience.  The strength of the experiments 7 
presented here is that the findings are in line with existing literature. The current study 8 
was possible because it built on extensive published behavioral literature and was able 9 
to confirm, with new means, existing conclusions made with more traditional methods 10 
and data (e.g. Metcalfe & Finn, 2008b).  We strongly believe that in this way subjective 11 
reports can be used to complement and develop existing findings. Given the inherently 12 
subjective nature of the processes under investigation in the metacognitive literature, it 13 
is clear that there are invaluable insights we can gain from probing for additional, 14 
subjective information from participants. If such approaches should go hand-in-hand 15 
with other methods of experimental design and data analysis, the field as a whole 16 
should benefit as a consequence. 17 
For example, future work could investigate how the present results would 18 
compare to the immediate JOL paradigm, in which participants render judgment 19 
immediately after study, with both the cue and the target present. Behaviourally, 20 
immediate JOLs have been demonstrated to differ from delayed JOLs and to rely on 21 
different types of evidence (Koriat & Bjork, 2006; Rhodes & Tauber, 2011). Whereas 22 
delayed JOLs require an evaluation of access to information in long-term memory, 23 
immediate JOLs rely primarily on information held in short-term memory.  24 
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Consequently, one would expect to observe different patterns of responses and distinct 1 
content in justifications for immediate as compared to delayed JOLs; for example, 2 
participants do not need to attempt to retrieve the target which is present in immediate 3 
JOLs and they might instead focus on the level of association between the cue and the 4 
target (Koriat & Bjork, 2005). Based on the current findings, our prediction is that 5 
participants should be able to produce justifications of their immediate JOLs and these 6 
would reference the relationship between the cue and the target. A similar paradigm 7 
employed in other types of metacognitive tasks is likely to confirm that metacognition 8 
can collectively be considered an evidence aggregation and evaluation process. 9 
Conversely, it would be of interest to investigate which types of influences participants 10 
might not be aware of through failing to account for them in their justifications. 11 
In summary, we provide evidence for metacognitive confidence judgements as 12 
resulting from evaluative processes that weigh the degree of evidence toward the 13 
decision framed by the response-eliciting question (in this case, ‘will this item be 14 
remembered?’). The present study demonstrates that participants have at least a degree 15 
of access into this process and can justify the JOLs they are making. What is more, they 16 
do so with reference to processes observed to influence JOL magnitude in the literature. 17 
Importantly, the results demonstrate that widely used numeric confidence JOLs are 18 
unlikely to have an underlying yes/no direct mapping. At the very least, this distinction 19 
is unlikely to be couched in probabilistic terms (e.g. 40% interpreted as a rejection of 20 
future retrieval). This finding should guide future assessment and interpretation of 21 
metacognitive confidence judgments.  22 
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Table 1 1 
Number of justifications collected in each JOL category by experiment 2 
Exp1 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
 
127 146 134 120 132 137 
Exp2 
No - Sure No - Maybe No - Guess Yes - Guess Yes - Maybe Yes – Sure 
 
102 177 137 102 195 205 
  3 
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Table 2  1 
Cue-justification and target-justification LSA scores by category and experiment  2 
 
Experiment 
 
JOL category 
Cue  
LSA score 
Target  
LSA score 
 
t-value 
 
df 
 
p-value 
 
d 
1 0% .21 (.14) .17 (.12) 2.29 120 .024* 0.30 
 20% .20 (.13) .17 (.10) 2.42 143 .017* 0.27 
 40% .20 (.11) .19 (.11) 0.55 133 .581 0.07 
 60% .17 (.12) .19 (.13) 1.58 119 .118 0.19 
 80% .20 (.13) .21 (.14) 0.39 129 .700 0.05 
 100% .21 (.12) .24 (.14) 2.09 134 .039* 0.22 
2 No - Sure .08 (.12) .06 (.11) 1.14 98 .259 0.12 
 No - Maybe .08 (.12) .08 (.13) 0.38 171 .704 0.03 
 No - Guess .11 (.14) .08 (.13) 2.79 133 .006* 0.25 
 Yes - Guess .14 (.17) .09 (.13) 2.64 101 .010* 0.31 
 Yes - Maybe .10 (.13) .09 (.13) 1.03 192 .302 0.08 
 Yes - Sure .14 (.17) .16 (.19) 1.37 202 .172 0.11 
Note. Cue and target LSA score descriptives expressed as: mean (standard deviation). 3 
Results of paired-samples t-tests comparing the cue and target LSA scores within each 4 
JOL category are also reported. *s indicate significance at an alpha threshold of .05.  5 
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Table 3  1 
N-gram analysis results for Experiment 1 2 
JOL n-gram Count Total Proportion p 
0% not remember this 8 11 .73 <.001 
 remember seeing this 13 30 .43 <.001 
 remember what word 6 11 .55 .004 
 do not remember 39 66 .59 <.001 
 seeing this word 13 31 .42 <.001 
 I do not 43 79 .54 <.001 
 remember this word 10 26 .38   .005 
 I cannot remember 17 45 .38 <.001 
 not remember seeing 25 32 .78 <.001 
 cannot remember what 9 19 .47 .001 
 cannot remember word 5 11 .45   .021 
 do not 58 114 .51 <.001 
 not remember 42 73 .58 <.001 
 that word 6 16 .38 .031 
 have no 7 11 .64 <.001 
 this word 31 99 .31 <.001 
 word at 6 10 0.6 .002 
 I do 43 81 .53 <.001 
 seeing this 14 33 .42 <.001 
 at all 18 23 .78 <.001 
 remember seeing 35 105 .33 <.001 
 cannot remember 34 88 .39 <.001 
 I cannot 22 78 .28 .007 
20% seeing word but 7 10 .70 <.001 
 be able to 12 37 .32  .034 
 do not think 8 14 .57 .001 
 not think I 7 13 .54 .004 
 vaguely remember seeing 8 10 .80 <.001 
 but I cannot 6 14 .43   .030 
 but cannot remember 7 17 .41   .025 
 I am not 11 30 .37   .016 
 do not really 7 10 .70 <.001 
 what it was 7 17 .41   .025 
 remember seeing word 14 42 .33   .026 
 what it 9 23 .39 .026 
 not confident 6 12 0.5 .013 
 be able 12 37 .32 .034 
 not really 8 11 .73 <.001 
 not think 9 15 .60 <.001 
 am not 11 33 .33 .034 
 I cannot 24 78 .31 .008 
 word so 5 11 .45 .036 
 really remember 10 15 .67 <.001 
 seeing word 17 48 .35 .005 
 vaguely remember 11 14 .79 <.001 
 might be 6 10 .60 .004 
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 with it 6 15 .40 .042 
 I do 26 81 .32 .004 
 do not 39 114 .34 <.001 
 cannot remember 24 88 .27 .038 
 remember seeing 34 105 .32 <.001 
 but I 20 71 .28 .044 
40% think I remember 6 16 .38 .040 
 word but cannot 7 11 .64 <.001 
 word but I 7 13 .54 .003 
 if I saw 7 14 .50 .004 
 I remember seeing 17 39 .44 <.001 
 think I could 6 13 .46 .013 
 remember word but 5 11 .45 .026 
 I think I 15 52 .29 .026 
 word and 9 29 .31 .048 
 word it 5 12 .42 .038 
 word I 7 18 .39 .022 
 second word 8 22 .36 .022 
 to recognise 7 18 .39 .022 
 I could 20 63 .32 .004 
 but I 20 71 .28 .016 
 if I 13 29 .45 <.001 
 word but 25 58 .43 <.001 
 I may 8 19 .42 .008 
 but cannot 12 29 .41 .002 
 cannot recall 8 19 .42 .008 
 I think 27 85 .32 <.001 
 recognise it 10 28 .36 .018 
 think I 26 82 .32 <.001 
 I remember 41 176 .23 .026 
 remember seeing 26 105 .25 .036 
60% but I am 7 18 .39 .012 
 I feel like 6 18 .33 .043 
 I think I 21 52 .40 <.001 
 I am not 9 30 .30 .036 
 remember making 7 13 .54 .001 
 could recognise 5 10 .50 .010 
 I might 6 16 .38 .025 
 I feel 13 35 .37 .001 
 and I 9 20 .45 .001 
 I am 19 71 .27 .011 
 think I 27 82 .33 <.001 
 feel I 6 13 .46 .008 
 I can 13 45 .29 .019 
 pair word 8 15 .53 <.001 
  it but 6 15 .40 .017 
 that I 11 38 .29 .023 
 its pair 5 14 .36 .048 
 between two 5 13 .38 .035 
 remember pair 6 17 .35 .033 
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 I think 27 85 .32 <.001 
 but I 19 71 .27 .011 
80% I remember word 10 28 .36 .018 
 I am pretty 9 14 .64 <.001 
 in my head 7 16 .44 .010 
 one of 5 11 .45 .025 
 am pretty 9 14 .64 <.001 
 pretty sure 5 10 .50 .015 
 it was 19 70 .27 .024 
 I remember 43 176 .24 .008 
 in my 10 31 .32 .028 
 I associated 6 14 .43 .019 
  my head 7 19 .37 .027 
100% I can remember 11 26 .42 <.001 
 link between 8 18 .44 .007 
 as I 7 19 .37 .033 
 thought of 5 10 .50 .018 
 it is 9 25 .36 .028 
 can remember 12 31 .39 .003 
  I can 14 45 .31 .027 
 I made 10 27 .37 .017 
Note. A count of occurrences of each n-gram in justifications for the corresponding JOL 1 
category are reported along with total number of occurrences, proportion of occurrence 2 
and p-value computed using the binomial test. 3 
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Table 4  1 
N-gram analysis results for Experiment 2 2 
JOL n-gram Count Total Proportion p 
No-Sure do not remember 28 78 .36 <.001 
 I cannot remember 16 78 .21 .017 
 I do not 37 93 .40 <.001 
 do not think 4 13 .31 .048 
 that I will 6 18 .33 .011 
 remember this word 11 31 .35 <.001 
 cannot remember seeing 7 12 .58 <.001 
 remember seeing this 9 33 .27 .008 
 seeing this word 11 38 .39 .002 
 not remember this 9 12 .75 <.001 
 remember this word 11 38 .29 .002 
 word at all 10 21 .48 <.001 
 not remember seeing 12 32 .38 <.001 
 do not even 11 12 .92 <.001 
 not even remember 11 11 1.00 <.001 
 do not 53 137 .39 <.001 
 this word 32 120 .27 <.001 
 not remember 33 89 .37 <.001 
 even remember 11 11 1 <.001 
 not recognise 5 11 .45 .004 
 I do 37 99 .37 <.001 
 have no 5 12 .42 .007 
 not think 5 15 .33 .020 
 no idea 6 11 .55 <.001 
 word at 10 25 .4 <.001 
 not even 11 13 .85 <.001 
 at all 16 34 .47 <.001 
 cannot remember 24 144 .17 .045 
 remember seeing 24 90 .27 <.001 
 seeing this 11 39 .28 .002 
 seeing word 13 48 .27 .002 
 was paired 6 22 .27 .029 
 not know 4 12 .33 .036 
 first word 6 21 .29 .023 
No-Maybe able to recognise 6 13 .46 .025 
might be able 8 15 .53 .003 
not sure if 5 11 .45 .044 
be able to 23 66 .35 .003 
I cannot remember 23 78 .29 .030 
that I would 5 10 .50 .028 
if I saw 6 13 .46 .025 
I might be 7 15 .47 .015 
may be able 7 11 .64 .002 
I would remember 7 10 .70 <.001 
cannot remember what 8 19 .42 .019 
cannot remember 41 144 .28 .008 
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 of two 6 14 .43 .037 
 now but 5 10 .50 .028 
 be able 23 66 .35 .003 
 would remember 7 10 .70 <.001 
 recognise it 13 37 .35 .021 
 to pair 5 11 .45 .044 
 what word 9 23 .39 .029 
 for this 6 14 .43 .037 
 I feel 10 24 .42 .016 
 sure if 5 11 .45 .044 
 to me 8 12 .67 <.001 
 if I 29 49 .59 <.001 
 it if 7 13 .54 .006 
 to mind 6 14 .43 .037 
 I may 13 21 .62 <.001 
 would recognise 8 21 .38 .047 
 I would 27 74 .36 <.001 
 I might 14 41 .34 .026 
 may be 8 18 .44 .014 
 able to 23 67 .34 .005 
 it but 10 22 .45 .005 
 remember what 12 34 .35 .027 
 might be 10 27 .37 .027 
 but I 26 92 .28 .034 
No-Guess to guess 6 16 .38 .023 
word so 9 24 .38 .006 
do not remember 25 78 .32 <.001 
not remember seeing 10 32 .31 .021 
do not recall 5 13 .38 .033 
cannot remember word 6 18 .33 .041 
I did not 6 17 .35 .031 
I do not 27 93 .29 <.001 
seeing word 15 48 .31 .004 
be guess 9 14 .64 <.001 
cannot remember 41 144 .28 <.001 
 not remember 29 89 .33 <.001 
 I do 28 99 .28 <.001 
 at all 11 34 .32 .012 
 have to 4 10 .40 .049 
 I did 6 18 .33 .041 
Yes-Guess think I would 10 21 .48 <.001 
I think I 16 47 .34 <.001 
but I cannot 9 25 .36 <.001 
I am sure 5 14 .36 .014 
I recall 5 10 .50 .002 
but cannot 12 36 .33 <.001 
 think I 21 77 .27 <.001 
 but I 23 92 .25 <.001 
 I could 9 35 .26 .012 
 I would 17 74 .23 .004 
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 again I 4 11 .36 .026 
 I think 25 88 .28 <.001 
 it when 5 13 .38 .010 
 I remember 24 139 .17 .030 
 word but 16 72 .22 .007 
 cannot remember 24 144 .17 .045 
 am not 13 47 .28 .001 
 but I 23 92 .25 <.001 
Yes-Maybe think I remember 7 13 .54 .010 
I think it 7 13 .54 .010 
when I see 14 23 .61 <.001 
think I will 6 13 .46 .040 
 
 
not hundred percent 10 15 .67 <.001 
I see it 14 17 .82 <.001 
presented with it 6 10 .60 .009 
hundred percent sure 9 13 .69 <.001 
to do with 11 19 .58 <.001 
 but not sure 7 15 .47 .025 
 word but not 9 18 .50 .006 
 something to do 11 16 .69 <.001 
 I think I 17 47 .36 .019 
 word and 15 37 .41 .008 
 I know 9 18 .50 .006 
 see it 14 18 .78 <.001 
 tried to 8 10 .80 <.001 
 percent sure 9 13 .69 <.001 
 I see 18 34 .53 <.001 
 when I 15 35 .43 .006 
 think I 28 77 .36 .002 
 and think 9 10 .90 <.001 
 it when 6 13 .46 .040 
 word when 7 13 .54 .010 
 something to 11 17 .65 <.001 
 word but 23 72 .32 .031 
 but not 20 40 .50 <.001 
 to do 11 19 .58 <.001 
 am not 16 47 .34 .047 
 it I 5 10 .50 .042 
 not hundred 10 15 .67 <.001 
 I think 35 88 .40 <.001 
 hundred percent 12 18 .67 <.001 
 do with 11 19 .58 <.001 
 will recognise 7 14 .50 .016 
 think it 8 15 .53 .006 
 with it 13 32 .41 .015 
Yes-Sure I remember word 10 24 .42 .045 
 in my head 13 20 .65 <.001 
 because I 14 31 .45 .004 
 my head 13 27 .48 .004 
 two words 15 38 .39 .018 
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 I remembered 14 20 .70 <.001 
 remember that 8 16 .50 .014 
 I remember 43 139 .31 .019 
 I imagined 6 10 .60 .011 
 association between 7 13 .54 .013 
 thought of 8 13 .62 .003 
 in my 23 55 .42 .002 
 can remember 16 40 .40 .012 
 I can 24 50 .48 <.001 
 I made 11 24 .46 .011 
Note. A count of occurrences of each n-gram in justifications for the corresponding JOL 1 
category are reported along with total number of occurrences, proportion of occurrence 2 
and p-value computed using the binomial test. 3 
  4 
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Table 6 1 
Number of justifications collected in each JOL category by group in Experiment 3 2 
Confidence 
JOL 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
 
115 102 69 75 67 124 
Binary JOL 
No - Sure No - Maybe No - Guess Yes - Guess Yes - Maybe Yes – Sure 
 
103 110 78 57 93 144 
  3 
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Table 7 1 
Cue-justification and target-justification LSA scores by category and group in Experiment 2 
3 3 
 
Experiment 
 
JOL category 
Cue  
LSA score 
Target  
LSA score 
 
t-value 
 
df 
 
p-value 
 
d 
1 0% .09 (.17) .04 (.08) 2.65 113 .009* 0.25 
 20% .09 (.16) .03 (.06) 3.58 100 <.001* 0.36 
 40% .09 (.17) .04 (.07) 2.60 66 .011* 0.32 
 60% .13 (.17) .11 (.20) 0.69 74 .494 0.08 
 80% .17 (.22) .14 (.18) 1.00 65 .322 0.12 
 100% .14 (.20) .15 (.21) 0.64 122 .523 0.06 
2 No - Sure .10 (.18) .03 (.07) 3.72 100 <.001* 0.37 
 No - Maybe .09 (.15) .03 (.06) 4.01 109 <.001* 0.38 
 No - Guess .05 (.09) .04 (.09) 1.65 74 .104  0.19 
 Yes - Guess .09 (.15) .08 (.16) 0.52 55 .607 0.07 
 Yes - Maybe .10 (.24) .07 (.16) 1.09 89 .279 0.12 
 Yes - Sure .13 (.20) .21 (.26) 2.90 143 .004 0.24 
Note. Cue and target LSA score descriptives expressed as: mean (standard deviation). 4 
Results of paired-samples t-tests comparing the cue and target LSA scores within each 5 
JOL category are also reported. *s indicate significance at an alpha threshold of .05.  6 
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Table 8  1 
N-gram analysis results for the numeric confidence JOL group of Experiment 3 2 
JOL n-gram Count Total Proportion p 
0% not remember this 10 11 .91 <.001 
 not remember seeing 25 25 1 <.001 
 remember seeing word 6 11 .55 .014 
 I do not 42 60 .70 <.001 
 do not remember 63 72 .88 <.001 
 not remember 63 72 .88 <.001 
 seeing word 6 13 .46 .035 
 this word 17 41 .41 .003 
 I do 43 62 .69 <.001 
 seeing this 6 10 .60 .008 
 at all 12 15 .80 <.001 
 cannot recall 7 11 .64 .002 
 do not 76 102 .75 <.001 
 remember seeing 30 45 .67 <.001 
 do 76 111 .68 <.001 
 even 8 11 .73 <.001 
 seeing 32 51 .63 <.001 
 remember 76 272 .28 .004 
 not 84 195 .43 <.001 
 at 13 35 .37 .022 
 all 15 19 .79 <.001 
 no 13 15 .87 <.001 
 now 9 21 .43 .026 
 any 8 12 .67 .001 
20% I cannot remember 7 11 .64 .001 
 I remember seeing 7 10 .70 .001 
 cannot remember 12 23 .52 <.001 
 but cannot 8 15 .53 .002 
 word but 10 17 .59 <.001 
 I cannot 11 22 .50 .001 
 but not 11 27 .41 .006 
 come 8 16 .50 .004 
 other 10 28 .36 .026 
 but 43 118 .36 <.001 
 what 14 42 .33 .026 
 it 40 160 .25 .040 
 cannot 22 50 .44 <.001 
 later 6 10 .60 .004 
40% second word 5 12 .42 0.011 
 trying to 7 10 .70 <.001 
 not sure 5 16 .31 0.04 
 have vague 6 10 .60 <.001 
 word and 6 22 .27 0.047 
 of my 4 10 .40 0.027 
 really 4 11 .36 0.038 
 more 8 21 .38 0.003 
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 trying 7 10 .70 <.001 
 be 9 34 .26 0.031 
 out 8 23 .35 0.005 
 vague 6 10 .60 <.001 
60% think I remember 4 11 .36 .050 
 think it 7 17 .41 .005 
 if I 4 10 .40 .036 
 I think 15 63 .24 .025 
 it is 12 28 .43 <.001 
 sure 9 35 .26 .045 
 can 8 28 .29 .045 
 if 7 21 .33 .017 
 think 26 108 .24 .003 
 is 23 84 .27 .001 
80% I think I 8 24 .33 .006 
 remember paired word 4 12 .33 .047 
 I am 13 47 .28 .003 
 paired word 8 31 .26 .028 
 think I 11 38 .29 .004 
 they 6 13 .46 .002 
 paired 9 39 .23 .046 
 or 11 32 .34 .001 
 as 11 42 .26 .014 
 pretty 5 13 .38 .014 
  am 16 53 .30 <.001 
100% in my 11 26 .42 .030 
 in 29 89 .33 .029 
 very 6 12 .50 .033 
 thought 6 12 .50 .033 
 clearly 6 10 .60 .011 
 imagined 6 10 .60 .011 
  both 9 14 .64 .001 
 made 15 38 .39 .018 
 my 21 58 .36 .017 
 because 16 37 .43 .005 
 are 6 10 .60 .011 
 and 39 126 .31 .024 
Note. A count of occurrences of each n-gram in justifications for the corresponding JOL 1 
category are reported along with total number of occurrences, proportion of occurrence 2 
and p-value computed using the binomial test. 3 
  4 
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Table 9  1 
N-gram analysis results for the binary JOL group of Experiment 3 2 
JOL n-gram Count Total Proportion p 
No-Sure not remember seeing 9 11 .82 <.001 
 I do not 29 69 .42 <.001 
 do not know 12 21 .57 <.001 
 remember this word 6 10 .60 .003 
 do not remember 22 48 .46 <.001 
 right now 5 10 .50 .018 
 I have 10 29 .34 .024 
 seeing word 6 16 .38 .044 
 sure I 6 13 .46 .015 
 at all 8 14 .57 .001 
 not remember 25 58 .43 <.001 
 I do 29 74 .39 <.001 
 not know 12 26 .46 .001 
 seeing this 5 10 .50 .018 
 this word 13 30 .43 .001 
 know it 5 12 .42 .042 
 no idea 13 20 .65 <.001 
 do not 48 106 .45 <.001 
 remember seeing 13 41 .32 .022 
 do 48 123 .39 <.001 
 recollect 5 12 .42 .042 
 even 10 12 .83 <.001 
 seeing 19 51 .37 .001 
 idea 13 28 .46 <.001 
 no 18 37 .49 <.001 
 not 62 232 .27 <.001 
 all 11 19 .58 <.001 
No-Maybe but I do 5 11 .45 .037 
but I cannot 7 14 .50 .007 
did not 8 19 .42 .015 
word but 10 19 .53 .001 
if I 7 18 .39 .035 
word  8 13 .62 .001 
not think 6 15 .40 .043 
remember word 10 26 .38 .018 
second word 6 10 .60 .004 
but I 26 70 .37 <.001 
remember what 9 15 .60 <.001 
maybe 11 25 .44 .003 
 word 56 218 .26 .009 
 did 9 20 .45 .006 
 come 8 20 .40 .020 
 more 7 13 .54 .004 
 unsure 7 15 .47 .012 
 remember 67 254 .26 .002 
 but 51 151 .34 <.001 
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 what 16 50 .32 .026 
 second 8 15 .53 .002 
 cannot 24 70 .34 .002 
 time 15 28 .54 <.001 
 may 9 24 .38       .030 
 back 7 17 .41 .025 
 seen 5 11 .45 .037 
 connection 7 18 .39 .035 
No-Guess I cannot remember 9 22 .41 .001 
but it 5 14 .36 .028 
cannot remember 15 47 .32 .001 
feel like 5 11 .45 .009 
I cannot 13 36 .36 <.001 
partner word 4 10 .40 .032 
partner 4 11 .36 .045 
guess 7 20 .35 .011 
Yes-Guess to do with 5 11 .45 .002 
I thought about 5 13 .38 .005 
I can remember 5 14 .36 .008 
something to do 5 11 .45 .002 
thought about 5 13 .38 .005 
do with 5 11 .45 .002 
 can remember 5 14 .36 .008 
 there is 5 12 .42 .004 
 I could 8 25 .32 .002 
 to do 5 14 .36 .008 
 was something 5 10 .50 .001 
 might be 4 10 .40 .011 
 I was 4 10 .40 .011 
 something to 5 11 .45 .002 
 really 5 17 .29 .019 
 feel 6 20 .30 .009 
 get 5 11 .45 .002 
Yes-Maybe be able to 7 20 .35 .027 
am not sure 8 21 .38 .011 
I think I 11 21 .52 <.001 
but I am 9 17 .53 <.001 
 
 
I think it 7 17 .41 .010 
I am not 16 36 .44 <.001 
I am 21 75 .28 .006 
think it 8 20 .40 .008 
think I 12 36 .33 .009 
 be able 7 20 .35 .027 
 am not 17 38 .45 <.001 
 not sure 13 36 .36 .002 
 I think 23 57 .40 <.001 
 I may 7 14 .50 .003 
 but not 7 16 .44 .007 
 remember it 8 25 .32 .046 
 it is 12 39 .31 .014 
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 to 30 136 .22 .044 
 similar 5 11 .45 .019 
 something 16 50 .32 .003 
 think 27 86 .31 <.001 
 it 43 195 .22 .017 
 forget 5 10 .50 .012 
 be 11 37 .30 .037 
 am 22 79 .28 .005 
Yes-Sure in my head 6 11 .55 .029 
 in my mind 8 15 .53 .014 
 I remembered 14 17 .82 <.001 
 in my 17 31 .55 <.001 
 I know 11 24 .46 .028 
 in 27 69 .39 .007 
 clearly 9 13 .69 .001 
 words 19 52 .37 .050 
 associated 20 49 .41 .011 
 remembered 18 28 .64 <.001 
 my 24 51 .47 <.001 
Note. A count of occurrences of each n-gram in justifications for the corresponding JOL 1 
category are reported along with total number of occurrences, proportion of occurrence 2 
and p-value computed using the binomial test. 3 
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 1 
Figure 2: Mean proportion of trials in each JOL category by experiment. Error bars 2 
indicate standard error of the mean. 3 
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